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Abstract 
Continuous innovation and a growing consumer demand for better and safer products has led to an 
increase of transnational technical standard-setting in recent years. The World Trade Organization 
(WTO) exercises a high level of deference towards international standards, requiring their use. 
However, practice shows that several international standards are adopted through opaque and 
exclusionary processes. In line with this observation, in its recent US – Tuna II ruling, the Appellate 
Body adopted a more critical approach regarding international standards and the processes that lead to 
their adoption. Against this backdrop, this paper focuses on an analysis of the properties and 
mechanics of international standard-setting processes within the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), discussing procedural and substantive guarantees regarding transparency, 
openness, deliberation and participation. As the WTO becomes the de facto arbiter of the legitimacy of 
international standards, much-needed institutional reform in international standard-setting is bound to 
occur, in line with emerging demands for a more inclusive global legal order.  
Keywords 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO); due process; standard-setting processes; 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement; TBT Committee Decision on development of 
international standards 
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A. Introductory Remarks* 
International standards play an increasingly conspicuous role in the WTO agreements. Already the 
preamble of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) commences with the – by now 
trivial, but not necessarily axiomatic – assumption that international standards improve efficiency of 
production and facilitate the conduct of international trade.
1
 Therefore, they should be adhered to, for 
all practical purposes. The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) includes 
statements along similar lines. However, due to the sensitivity of public health protection as a 
legitimate public policy objective, the SPS is more flexible by acknowledging the right of Members to 
choose their level of protection which may go beyond standards adopted at the international level.
2
 
Standards are a form of codified technical knowledge that enables the development of products and 
processes. They regularize and constrain behavior (regulative function); lend a taken-for-granted 
quality to certain technologies and modi operandi (cognitive function); and favor cooperative 
strategies over adversarial ones (normative function).
3
 The last function in particular can have a long-
lasting beneficial effect: this is because standardization creates an infrastructure that, once created, 
parties have an incentive to use it, resulting in increased cooperation and enabling users to take full 
advantage of the network effects of standardization. Absent some form of standard-setting, 
technological progress would miss an important instrument for benchmarking and capitalizing on 
advances in the field of technology. In addition, first-mover advantages in standardization
4
 are 
substantial incentives for firms to innovate.
5
 In that sense, standards are constitutive of markets
6
 and a 
decisive instrument for economic growth.
7
  
                                                     
*
 An early version of this paper was presented at the biennial conference of the Society of International Economic Law in 
Berne in July 2014 and benefited from insightful comments by the participants. Financial support from Qualcomm Inc. of 
TILEC’s work on standardisation is gratefully acknowledged. An updated draft was presented in the conference on 
‘Standards, Regulation and (Transatlantic) Trade Integration’ in Florence in November 2014. The author would like to 
thank in particular Alessandra Arcuri, Axel Marx, Jens Prüfer, Petros Mavroidis, Charles Sabel, Harm Schepel, Philip 
Schleifer, Florian Schütt and Erik Wijkström. Any remaining errors or misconceptions are of the author’s alone. 
1
 G. Swann, P. Temple, and M. Shrumer, ‘Standards and Trade Performance : the UK Experience’, 106(438) Economic 
Journal (1996), pp. 1297-1313. 
2
 At the same time, the SPS is more rigid than the TBT in that, contrary to the latter, it considers as international only those 
standards created by international organizations that are mentioned explicitly in Annex 1, that is, the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, the International Office of Epizootics and the International Plant Protection Convention (the so-called 
‘three sister organizations’). Standards by other international organizations are not excluded, but it seems that the SPS 
Committee would need to approve these organizations as being ‘relevant international organizations’. A first step, it 
seems, for such an approval is obtaining an observer status to the SPS Committee. Insterestingly, the fact that there are 
three organizations explicitly mentioned has two effects : first, it seems that they have a privileged status vis-à-vis other 
observers to the Committee in their capacity as interlocutors. Second, because of their privileged status, they are much 
more transparent vis-a-vis the SPS with regard to their standard-setting processes, dispute settlement procedures and 
strategic future planning. See also WTO, SPS Committee, ‘Observers in the SPS Committee – Their Role and 
Outstanding Requests’, G/SPS/GEN/1157, 25 June 2012. In US – Tuna II, the Appellate Body underscored this 
peculiarity of the TBT vis-à-vis the SPS, suggesting that the TBT Agreement aimed ‘to encourage the development of 
international standards also by bodies that were not already engaged in standardizing activities at the time of adoption of 
the TBT Agreement’: See Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II, para. 379. 
3
 C. Lane, ‘The Social Regulation of Inter-Firm Relations in Britain and Germany : Market Rules, Legal Norms and 
Technical Standards’, 21 Cambridge Journal of Economics (1997) 197. 
4
 Art. 1.1 of he ISO/IEC Guide 2 :2004 defines standardization as the ‘activity of establishing, with regard to actual or 
potential problems, provisions for common and repeated use, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in 
a given context. Note 1 : in particular, the activity consists of the processes of formulating, issuing and implementing 
standards.’  
5
 Again, and more generally, if we consider standardization as infrastructure, it can promote but also hamper innovation. 
See also D. Acemoglu; G. Gancia; and F. Zilibotti, ‘Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization’, 147 
Journal of Economic Theory (2012) 570. 
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Many times, standards, no matter how well-crafted, can impede trade. This is mainly because 
standards reflect preferences and values of a given populace which may – and usually do – diverge, 
thereby inflating compliance costs for companies.
8
 If developed internationally, then substantial gains 
can be made through the diminution of such costs and by addressing network externalities and 
information asymmetries.
9
 As a result, international standardization soon became the preferred layer of 
regulatory action, both government- and private-driven.
10
 Globalization vindicates this choice: as 
global supply chains become increasingly important, international standards only grow in 
prominence.
11
  
The costs for this seemingly irreversible shift of locus of standardization may be minimal or 
substantial, depending on the level of sophistication that the relevant firms display. The consumer, on 
the other hand, is a net winner due to this development: economic theory would suggest that an 
international standard reduces consumer costs, as information becomes more readily available and 
prices more readily comparable.
12
  
The WTO, a generally reluctant international organization regarding the use of non-WTO material 
to assess the WTO compliance of a given Member, is more lenient when the output of international 
standard-setting bodies (ISSBs) is at stake. Much of previous WTO case-law, most prominently, cases 
like EC – Hormones and EC – Sardines,13 exemplify this deferential approach. In both cases, non-
consensual international standards were considered as relevant benchmarks for assessing WTO 
compatibility of national measures. For a consensual organization such as the WTO, whereby the 
legacy of consensus is one of the overarching legitimating artefacts of the multilateral trading system, 
this is quite extraordinary.  
The texts of the SPS and TBT, respectively, only partially vindicate such unconditional deference 
to ISSBs. More recently, in US – Tuna II, the Appellate Body has given signs of a more critical 
approach vis-à-vis non-WTO standards as relevant benchmarks for assessing compliance with WTO 
law. The Appellate Body ruled that no automatic and thus mechanical comparison should be made 
between the relevant international standard and the measure at issue. Rather, before this comparison 
takes place, an examination of the procedural and substantive guarantees of the standard-setter at issue 
is opportune. This judicial finding points to the penumbra of processes used within ISSBs. Admittedly, 
our knowledge about the mechanics of international standard-setting is quite limited. Hearsay about 
lack of representativeness and inclusiveness is not uncommon, whereas anecdotal evidence about 
power politics and strategic behavior exists and makes headlines from time to time. More recently, the 
shortcomings of international standardization processes became a central issue in the non-agricultural 
market access (NAMA) negotiations within the WTO.
14
 
(Contd.)                                                                  
6
 H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance – Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets (Hart 
Publishing, 2005). 
7
 K. Blind and A. Jungmittag, ‘The Impact of Patents and Standards on Macroeconomic Growth : A Panel Approach 
Covering Four Countries and 12 Sectors’, 29 Journal of Productivity Analysis (2008) 51. 
8
 R. Staiger and A. Sykes, ‘International Trade, National Treatment and Domestic Regulation’, 40 Journal of Legal Studies 
(2011) 149. 
9
 See WTO, World Trade Report 2005. 
10
 T. Büthe and W. Mattli, ‘Setting International Standards – Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power ?’, 56 World 
Politics (2003) 1; K. Tamm Hallström, Organizing International Standardization – ISO and the IASC in Quest of 
Authority (Edward Elgar, 2004). 
11
 World Economic Forum (WEF), The Global Enabling Trade Report 2012 – Reducing Supply Chain Barriers, 2012. 
12
 See WTO, World Trade Report 2012, p. 136. 
13
 Nowadays, mention is exclusively made of the European Union and no longer of the European Community, as a result of 
the entry of the Treaty of Lisbon into force. See Art. 1 para. 3 of the European Union Treaty. 
14
 WTO, Negotiating Group on Market Access, ‘Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products – International Standards in 
Support of Trade and Economic Development: Strengthening the Contribution of the Committee Decision’, 
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Against this backdrop, a closer analysis of the properties of international standard-setting is 
apposite and timely. Recognition of any rule presupposes contestation, which, in turn, inevitably 
enquires into how standards are adopted.
15
 This paper attempts to take an empirical take on 
international standard-setting processes to identify what type of procedural and substantive guarantees 
are in place to ensure that international standards adopted in these fora are in line with basic tenets of 
due process or transparency. In this respect, procedural and substantive guarantees regarding 
transparency, openness, deliberation and participation in the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), the most important standard-setting body internationally, will be scrutinized. 
The vantage point of the paper is that attributing to international standards developed elsewhere 
automatic legal force in the WTO is contrary to contemporary demands for more transparency and due 
process within global governance institutions, more generally, and openness in international standard-
setting, in particular.
16
 In times of increased legalization of international rule-making, a general 
enquiry into the necessary guarantees (or a ‘democratic minimum’)17 with which an international 
standard-setter would need to comply is indispensable. At this juncture, the role and influence of the 
WTO in these standard-setting processes as a potential drive for change will also form part of the 
analysis that the paper offers. Section B describes the position of international standards in the TBT by 
reference to the current legal framework and case-law, whereas section C presents a tentative 
empirical account, and subsequently a critical assessment, of standard-setting processes within ISO. 
Section D concludes. 
B. International standards and the TBT 
The multilateral trading system was initially based on a negative integration contractual approach: 
non-discrimination has been the overarching principle of the system and the linchpin of this approach, 
allowing for sufficient leeway to domestic regulatory authorities to unilaterally define the set of 
policies they would want to adopt. Thus, international standards and, a fortiori, the bodies that 
promulgate them, were outside the spectrum of the GATT, a situation that would resemble a tale of 
two solitudes paving their own, separate ways of exerting influence over commercial transactions.
18
  
The advent of the WTO would not change much with respect to the lack of any capacity of the 
trading system to create technical standards itself. However, it would shift gears as to the level of 
integration sought regarding non-tariff barriers, with an emphasis on regulations of technical nature 
and measures purportedly taken to protect public health or safety.
19
 Both the TBT and the SPS would 
now clearly strive for regulatory convergence using international standards as benchmarks regarding 
(Contd.)                                                                  
TN/MA/W/141, 29 March 2011 (referring to the TBT Committee Decision relating to the development of international 
standards, see below, Section B). 
15
 See H. Schepel, ‘Rules of Recognition: A Legal Constructivist Approach to Transnational Private Regulation’ in P. 
Jurčys; P. Kjaer; and R. Yatsunami (eds), Regulatory Hybridization in the Transnational Sphere (Brill, 2013), 189, at 
197. 
16
 Cf. A. von Bogdandy, ‘The European Lesson for International Democracy : The Significance of Articles 9-12 EU Treaty 
for International Organizations’, 23(2) European Journal of International Law (2012) 315. 
17
 See N. Krisch, ‘The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods’, 108(1) American Journal 
of International Law (2014), 1. 
18
 It is only in the Tokyo Round in the mid-70s that the issue of technical barriers to trade and the role that international 
standards could play was discussed, in a first, albeit plurilateral attempt to address non-tariff barriers. See A. Sykes, 
Product Standards for Internationally Integrated Goods Markets, Brookings Institution Press, 1995. 
19
 See also J. Peel, ‘A GMO by Any Other Name…Might Be an SPS Risk !: Implications of Expanding the Scope of the 
WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement’, 17(5) European Journal of International Law (2007) 1009, at 
1013. 
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the direction such convergence should take.
20
 Standards created in ISSBs such as ISO or the Codex 
Alimentarius were invariably regarded as authoritive expressions of international technical consensus. 
They could be used as proxies that would allow properly striking the balance in any given case 
between protectionism-driven domestic regulations and the well-meant protection of non-economic, 
public policy objectives. Thus, non-WTO material, i.e. international standards, would play the role of 
useful heuristic devices in this new area of growing positive integration within the WTO. This 
introduction of non-WTO material by reference was warranted absent any standard-setting capacity by 
the TBT or the SPS Committees or the WTO in general.
21
 
The TBT distinguishes between two types of measures: technical regulations and standards.
22
 The 
difference between the two lies on the degree of compliance: whereas for technical regulations 
compliance is mandatory, compliance is only voluntary in the case of standards. Still some overlap 
regarding the scope of the two categories is evident by reading the definitions provided for in the TBT 
Agreement; they both cover labeling requirements and production and process methods (PPMs). An 
additional difference between technical regulations and standards relates to the source of the measure: 
whereas technical regulations would typically be adopted by a governmental body and thus be a State 
measure, standards are typically issued by private or semi-private SSBs. Standards can become later 
technical regulations if adopted or used as a basis for legislative acts by the State. Recently, in US – 
Tuna II, the WTO adjudicating bodies blurred the distinction between the two types of TBT measures 
by arguing that a voluntary dolphin-safe labeling scheme for tuna products access to which is subject 
to certain criteria as to how the tuna was harvested is a technical regulation and not a standard, 
although access to the US market for tuna was possible.
23
 
Article 2.4 TBT is the key provision when examining the relation between international standards 
and the TBT. Pursuant to this provision, relevant international standards or relevant parts thereof 
(when they exist or are about to be adopted) must be used as a basis for domestic technical regulations 
unless they are ineffective of inappropriate means for meeting the public policy objectives sought. 
International standards are used as a basis when they are the principal constituent or fundamental 
principle for the purpose of enacting the technical regulation at stake. Furthermore, there is no 
restriction with respect to time: hence, international standards created before the entry of the TBT into 
force can also be relevant if the state of the art has not changed in the meantime with the adoption of a 
new international standard.
24
 In other words, previously voluntary standards all of a sudden become 
mandatory benchmarks for domestic technical regulations. This changed forever the way international 
standards, particularly those created within ISO, were perceived by States; ISSBs grew in salience – 
but also came under States’ and scholars’ spotlight – very quickly.25 
Article 2.5 incorporates a presumption of TBT compatibility for those technical regulations that are 
in accordance with relevant international standards and pursue a legitimate objective. The rationale 
behind this ‘safe haven’ is that voluntary international standards incorporate international preferences 
                                                     
20
 See G. Marceau and J. Trachtman, ‘The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Agreement, and The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic 
Regulation of Goods’, 36(5) Journal of World Trade (2002) 811. 
21
 See also D. Motaal, ‘The “Multilateral Scientific Consensus” and the World Trade Organization’, 38(5) Journal of World 
Trade (2004) 855. 
22
 TBT Agreement, Annex 1. On the definition of technical regulation in Annex 1.1 TBT, see Appellate Body Report, EC – 
Seal Products, paras 5.8ff. 
23
 See also P. Delimatsis, ‘“Relevant International Standards” and “Recognized Standardization Bodies” under the TBT 
Agreement’ in P. Delimatsis (ed.), The Law, Economics and Politics of International Standardisation (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, forthcoming). 
24
 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 205. 
25
 See also W. Higgins and K. Tamm Hallström, ‘Standardization, Globalization and Rationalities of Government’, 14(5) 
Organization (2007) 685, at 696. 
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and constitute artefacts of widely accepted technical superiority. In addition, Article 2.9 imposes 
additional notification requirements in case relevant international standards are not used. Hence, the 
tilt towards the use of relevant international standards is manifested in a varying manner: first, a 
requirement that Members use relevant international standards in a positive manner and the creation of 
a rebuttable presumption of consistency as an extra ‘carrot’; second, the imposition of additional 
burdensome conditions that Members need to abide by if they disregard international standards.  
In other words, in those areas where international standards exist, they become the reference point 
and de facto mandatory normative technical material to be used by WTO Members. As a result, a mass 
of documents of at best uncertain legal normativity are transformed into international obligations 
equivalent to treaty text.
26
 As noted earlier, this is even more striking if one considers the meticulous 
character of the analysis that typically the WTO adjudicating bodies undertake when attempting to 
classify particular legal texts under one of the subparagraphs of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 
For such an unequivocal endorsement of legal material generated outside the WTO, the TBT 
Agreement is quite cryptic with respect to what constitutes a relevant international standard.
27
 Only a 
generic definition of a standard is available in the TBT, which provides that it entails a 
[d]ocument approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, 
guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with which 
compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production 
method. (Emphasis added) 
Importantly, the explanatory note that follows suggests that, whereas standards adopted by the 
‘international standardization community’ are based on consensus, the TBT covers also documents 
that are not based on consensus.  
The definition of a standard in the ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004 (the update of ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991 on 
which the TBT is based) is, for all practical purposes, similar to the one in TBT, albeit with important 
nuances: 
‘document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, that provides for 
common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed 
at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context.--- Note: Standards should 
be based on the consolidated results of science technology and experience, and aimed at the 
promotion of optimum community benefits.’
28
 (Emphasis added)  
The Guide considers as international those standards that are adopted by an international 
standardizing/standards organization and made available to the public.
29
 In turn, international 
standardizing organization is defined as the organization (that is, the body that is based in the 
membership of other bodies or individuals and has an established constitution and its own 
administration) whose membership is open to the relevant national body from every country.
30
 Thus, 
                                                     
26
 See also R. Howse, ‘A New Device for Creating International Legal Normativity: The WTO Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement and “International Standards”’ in Joerges and Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade 
Governance and International Economic Law (Hart, 2011), 383. 
27
 The lack of a definition of what an international standard is may also be due to the fundamental disagreement between 
the EU and the US as to what an international standard and an international standard-setting body stand for. This is an 
issue that is currently discussed in the negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). See 
CEN/CENELEC, ‘Position Paper on EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – Technical Barriers 
to Trade – Initial EU Position Paper’, September 2013.  
28
 See ISO/IEC Guide 2 : 2004, Art. 3.2. 
29
 Echoed in the EU Regulation 1025/2012, Art. 2(1)(a). 
30
 See ISO/IEC Guide 2 : 2004, Arts 4.3.2 and 4.2. 
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when examining the international nature of a standard, attention should be had on the traits of the 
institution promulgating it
31
 rather than the very content of the standard at issue.
32
 
What traits should such an institution have? The TBT definition of standard refers to ‘recognized’ 
standardization bodies. By the same token, Article 4.3 of the ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004 defines as 
standardizing those bodies which have recognized activities in standardization.
33
 The TBT further 
defines international bodies in an open-ended manner: international body is the body or system whose 
membership is open to the relevant bodies of all WTO Members. In addition, however, the 
international body should be recognized. In US – Tuna II, the Appellate Body suggested that 
recognition is reserved for active standardization bodies and suggested that ‘the larger the number of 
countries that participate in the development of a standard, the more likely it can be said that the 
respective body’s activities in standardization are “recognized”’.34  
Thus, recognition within the meaning of Article 1.2 TBT would be a function of the degree of 
recognition by WTO Members (through participation), rather than the standardization community (its 
‘peers’). The Appellate Body also noted that no quantitative benchmark should be in place with 
respect to standardization activities. Contextual analysis would be necessary whereby additional 
evidence with respect to the level of participation of WTO Members in the development of a given 
standard; wide recognition of the validity and legality of even a single standard; or adherence to the 
TBT Committee Decision of 2000 on principles for the development of international standards (the 
‘TBT Committee Decision’) would suggest that a given body has recognized activities on international 
standardization.
35
  
For the first time in US – Tuna II, in a highly important jurisprudential turn, adherence to the TBT 
Committee Decision was linked to the issue whether a given standard-setting body has recognized 
activities. In previous WTO disputes, international standards that were adopted with limited majority 
were considered as relevant international standards by the WTO adjudicating bodies: In EC – 
Sardines, the relevant Codex Alimentarius standard was adopted by 18 parties out of over 150 at that 
time. Similarly, in EC Hormones, the GMO standard (an SPS standard, but still indicative of the trend 
within the WTO vis-à-vis international standards) was adopted with 33 votes against 29 and 7 
abstentions. Both standards were adopted in a period where the GATT did not use international 
standards as benchmarks for GATT consistency.
36
  
However, in the aftermath of the adoption of the TBT and SPS, higher levels of scrutiny of 
standard-setting practices were deemed to be warranted and these disputes only served to alert WTO 
Members as to the possible challenges that an unqualified endorsement of standards adopted 
elsewhere would entail. Indeed, such jurisprudence, which in practice failed to take into account 
important controversies and debates in ISSBs, was sitting uncomfortably with the advocacy for more 
                                                     
31
 Compare the distinction between international, European and national standard in the EU Regulation 1025/2012, Article 
2(1) (a), (b) and (d). 
32
 See also WTO, TBT Committee, ‘Sixth Triennial Review of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: Standards’, 
Communication from Colombia, G/TBT/W/351, 21 March 2012, para. 8ff. 
33
 In US – Tuna II, the Appellate Body found that the ISO denifition of a standardizing body should assist in the 
interpretation of the TBT term ‘recognized body’. 
34
 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II, para. 390. 
35
 The wording used by the Appellate Body in this instance of the US – Tuna II report should not be taken to mean that 
wide participation in the adoption of a given standard or wide recognition of its validity or legality can remedy the non-
adherence to the TBT Committee Decision. As explained below, adherence to the Decision becomes a presequisite for 
any standard to be regarded as international for WTO/TBT purposes. 
36
 It should be noted here that the plurilateral Tokyo Round Code on Technical Barriers to Trade (the ‘Standards Code’), 
which was adopted in 1979, included in its Art. 2.2 a provision similar to Art. 2.4 TBT. However, the Code was only 
binding to those GATT contracting parties subscribing to it, that is, 32 countries. 
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openness and better governance in global institutions.
37
 As a result, in the year 2000, the TBT 
Committee agreed on six principles that should be observed by ISSBs when they develop international 
standards. It was a consensus-driven signal by the WTO that rules and procedures in ISSBs had to be 
strengthened. Clearly, it was an external call of reform. The principles that the TBT Committee 
Decision identified were: transparency; openness; impartiality and consensus; effectiveness and 
relevance; coherence; and addressing the concerns of the developing world (the so-called 
‘development dimension’).38 
Although the EU saw its position in EC – Sardines and EC Hormones being rejected by the WTO 
adjudicating bodies, anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the TBT Committee Decision of 2000 
was driven by the US, which came to realize that the EU was unduly dominating the domain of 
international standardization.
39
 The legal value of the Decision quickly became a controversial topic. 
In EC – Sardines, the Panel found that the Decision was not binding, but a mere ‘policy statement of 
preference’. Thus, the fact that the Codex standard at issue was not adopted by consensus was 
immaterial, also in line with the TBT definition of a standard. However, the TBT Committee Decision 
had a substantial impact on standard-setting processes, particularly within ISO. Whereas ISO very 
early reacted positively to the TBT Committee Decision and alleged that it complies with the 
principles enshrined therein,
40
 it also intensified its work with respect to ensuring due process in 
standards development, accommodating more intensively the concerns of developing countries or 
broadening the circle of stakeholder participation.  
The Appellate Body was not called upon to review the Panel’s finding in EC - Sardines, but it was 
given the opportunity to pronounce itself on the issue ten years later in US – Tuna II. Contrary to what 
the Panel found in EC – Sardines, the Appellate Body considered the TBT Committee Decision as a 
‘subsequent agreement’ within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) VCLT, which obliges any WTO treaty 
interpreter to read the Decision together with the text of the TBT. The Appellate Body was led to this 
conclusion based on various elements such as the fact that it was adopted by consensus; it bears 
specifically upon the interpretation and application of a TBT provision; and Members’ expressed 
intention to: (a) develop a better understanding of international standards within the TBT; (b) ensure 
the effective application of the TBT; and (c) clarify and strengthen the concept of international 
standards.
41
  
Indeed, agreements subsequent to the conclusion of a previous agreement aiming to specify how 
existing rules or obligations are to be applied (rather than to create new or extend existing obligations) 
can fall under Article 31(3)(a) VCLT, constituting a further authentic element of interpretation to be 
taken into account along with context.
42
 However, considering the TBT Committee Decision as 
‘subsequent agreement’ barely squares with the EC – Sardines previous finding that the last sentence 
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 Having said this, this jurisprudence is perhaps indicative of the WTO’s reluctance to engage in a discussion as to the 
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Standards, Guides and Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the Agreement’, G/TBT/9, 13 
November 2000. 
39
 I would like to thank Amelia Porges for pointing this part of the negotiating history to me. 
40
 See WTO, TBT Committee, ‘Developments within the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) that are 
related to the Second Triennial Review of the TBT Agreement’, Communication from ISO, G/TBT/W/158, 18 May 
2001. 
41
 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II, paras 371-2. 
42
 Cf. Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II), para. 391; and Appellate Body Report, US – 
Clove Cigarettes, para. 265. 
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of the Explanatory Note in Annex 1.2 TBT also relates to international standards. If it is so, and thus 
consensus should not be required for a standard to be regarded as a ‘relevant international standard’, 
then the TBT Committee Decision, by requiring consensus, amounts to an amendment of the TBT text, 
at least as far as international standards are concerned.
43
  
Based on these considerations, the Appellate Body found that an invitation-only regional standard-
setting body is not open to all WTO Members. It also noted that, in more generalized terms, 
standardization bodies must be open and transparent at every stage of developing standards in line 
with the TBT Committee Decision. 
In sum, the TBT exerts a high level of deference towards technical rationality as expressed through 
international standard-setting activities outside the WTO. Standards developed within ISSBs acquire a 
prominent role at the WTO through the very text of the TBT, which requires that WTO Members use 
‘relevant international standards’ and presumes compliance with the TBT when such standards are 
used as a basis for domestic technical regulations. It is one thing to state that the TBT Committee 
would be unable to develop any standards whatsoever. It is quite another to claim that certain non-
WTO rules can vindicate WTO consistency as long as they are relevant to the product at issue in a 
WTO dispute regardless of the process that led to their adoption. Recall that this process is totally out 
of the control of the WTO.  
Quite astonishingly, the TBT entails such delegation of regulatory power
44
 without any inquiry as 
to the actual processes used throughout the development of international technical standards. This is 
even more surprising if one considers that such regulatory outsourcing is directed towards private 
actors, thereby creating an alternative to formal international law.
45
 The US – Tuna II case seems to set 
the foundations for a shift towards a more critical approach that would take into account procedural 
and substantive safeguards within ISSBs when they elaborate international standards. This only makes 
sense: ISO in its capacity as the by far largest purveyor of international standards inevitably draws 
normativity and authority from the users of its standards, that is, traders originating in WTO Members. 
In other words, the WTO is the ex post ‘legitimator’ of international standards by default as per Article 
2.4 TBT, but it can potentially be an ex post arbiter of their legitimacy or a third-level authoritative 
monitoring and enforcement device for international standardization in general.  
For these reasons, gathering information about such guarantees is important. In the next section, we 
discuss the existing procedural and substantive guarantees in the most important ISSB in the realm of 
technical standards. Thus, it is ISO that we now turn. 
C. Procedural and Substantive Safeguards in ISO  
Standardization is emblematic of the increasing complexity in defining exactly the confines of ‘law’. It 
is a quasi-legal form of self-regulation and, depending on the circumstances and the legal context at 
hand, it can be a form of co-regulation, or else a (hybrid) public-private partnership.
46
 Some regional 
standardization bodies such as the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) fall under the latter 
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 Practice in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) would also suggest that Members by now view the TBT Committee 
Decision as the authoritive document for identifying what an international standard is. See, among many others, the US-
Australia Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 8 (TBT), Article 8.4.2. 
44
 For a similar observation under the SPS, see T. Büthe, ‘The globalization of health and safety standards : delegation of 
regulatory authority in the SPS Agreement of 1994 establishing the World Trade Organization’, 71 Law and 
Contemporary Problems (2008) 219. 
45
 E. Benvenisti, ‘“Coalitions of the Willing” and the Evolution of Informal International Law’ in C. Callies; G. Nolte; and 
P.-T. Stoll (eds), “Coalitions of the Willing” – Avantgarde or Threat? (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2007).  
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 N. Brunsson and B. Jacobsson (eds), A World of Standards (Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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category.
47
 Notably with regard to the EU, it is by now generally accepted that much of the influence 
that the EU member States exercise within the ISSBs is attributed to the New Approach, first 
introduced in the mid-90s, that revolutionized the way trade was conducted at the EU level and 
beyond, but also the way that standard-setting at the EU level (CEN, CENELEC, ETSI) mirrored 
standard-setting at the international level (ISO, IEC, ITU).
48
  
For many decades, standardization has served a complementary function to traditional (domestic) 
command-and-control regulation.
49
 Indeed, theory suggests that non-binding, or ‘soft’, norms such as 
standards act as gap-fillers for ‘harder’ forms of law.50 Modern states concede part of their powers to 
other actors that can act more effectively and swiftly mainly due to their expertise, focus and smaller 
size, thereby allowing non-state voices to be heard and accordingly reshuffling its regulatory behavior 
and supervisory role (for instance, by focusing to ex post control of a certain activity).
51
 The 
advantages of non-coercive, ‘soft’ forms of regulation transform states into catalysts, coordinators and 
supporters of certain activities at the national or transnational level.
52
 Notably the development of 
global business leads to an unprecedented expansion of regulatory rules that have a variety of 
penholders that are typically closer to the regulated object.
53
  
This approach is consistent with the premises of technical rationality
54
 - a kind of technocratic 
legitimacy or technocracy-based subsidiarity – and is considered as the result of low sovereignty costs 
for governments that such delegation of power entail, notably because much of standardization 
activities result in output of voluntary nature.
55
 Even so, it is indicative of the ever-increasing 
expansion of legitimate authority outside the State.
56
 However, unconditional transfer of rule-making 
powers does not always constitute good politics.
57
 For instance, under certain circumstances it may be 
worrisome if this type of soft law pre-empts hard forms of law, which may be justifiably more 
intrusive, seeking higher levels of protection.
58
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Power’ in J. Boli and G. Thomas (eds), Constructing World Culture – International Nongovernmental Organizations 
since 1875 (Stanford University Press, 1999). 
55
 See K. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, 54(3) International Organization (2000), 
421, at 441. 
56
 D. Vogel, ‘Private Global Business Regulation’, 11 Annual Review of Political Science (2008) 261. 
57
 A. Feenberg, Questioning Technology (Routledge, 1999). 
58
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As there are manifold technological approaches, a standard-setting body offers a forum where 
competitors and competing vested interests can resolve conflicts and coordination problems. Due to its 
importance, substantial financial resources and efforts are invested to standardization fora.
59
 The 
increase of standards-related patent disputes, the emergence of industry-sponsored consortia, but also 
actions against anticompetitive practices is indicative of the growing importance of standardization 
particularly in high-tech areas.
60
 Notwithstanding the importance of technical rationality and technical 
strength in standardization activities, standardization is nonetheless a highly politicized process 
whereby economic interests along with the quest for dominance among state and non-state actors 
shape its functioning.
61
 The more important standardization becomes, the fiercer is the competition for 
increased influence in SSBs.
62
 This pattern is reminiscent of the regulatory capture theory and 
associated doctrine of special interest groups, extensively discussed in social sciences, which has 
traditionally been associated with the function of the state and public authorities.
63
 By the same token, 
those involved in standards development can be captured by particular interests that seek to see a 
given standard develop in a manner that is advantageous to them. 
Evidence suggests that power politics and regulatory capture by the big States may be endemic in 
international standard-setting.
64
 Standardization can also be captured by the industries involved, which 
exploit the presence of asymmetric information and organization. An additional variable in this respect 
is the perennial conflict of interest that is endemic in SSBs for those subject to the standards are also 
those that promulgate them. Industries organize themselves more efficiently than consumers and 
manage to capture standard-setting institutions.
65
 This can also be the result of structural bias:
66
 for 
instance, ISO is a mainly non-governmental, industry-driven, international standard-setter.  
More recently established SSBs such as the International Social and Environmental Accreditation 
and Labelling (ISEAL) Alliance claim to be more inclusive, yet even in such bodies, full membership 
is reserved to those presumed to have the necessary technical expertise, that is, standard-setting 
organizations and accreditation bodies.
67
 Consumer associations or NGOs are barely involved in the 
actual development of the standards, but may engage more in the consultation stage later and shortly 
before the standard becomes final. The stakeholders involved in international standardization are of a 
hybrid nature and, like self-regulators, have a conflict of interest inherent in their functions: they are 
there to serve the interests of their constituents but also the national interest.
68
 Thus, without the 
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necessary procedural guarantees in place, the beneficial effects of standardization can be undermined 
if standardization cannot resist market power nor has the institutional sensitivity and accommodating 
structures to take into account important societal values and a multiplicity of interests.
69
 
I. ISO 
1. The (one-sided) objective of ISO 
ISO was the first general international standardizing body ever created.
70
 Its predecessor, the 
International Standards Association (ISA), a federation of the national standardizing associations, was 
mainly a club dominated by the continental European countries (the ‘metric bloc’). It evolved into a 
truly international body only after the World War II.
71
 ISO is not an intergovernmental organization 
and thus its output is deprived of any formal coercive force; rather, it is a network (or federation) of 
national SSBs, composed of both governmental and industry representatives. The ISO Secretariat is 
relatively small (138 full-time employees), serving a coordination function.  
The objective of ISO and thus its normative point is to promote the development of international 
standards with a view to facilitating trade and to developing cooperation with respect to intellectual, 
scientific, technological and economic activity.
72
 Thus, collective action within ISO should be about 
enabling commerce to flourish and, therefore, its activity and overall assessment should be based on 
this normative point of collective action within ISO, that is, how to encourage market access for 
traders.  
As it is, one cannot help but notice that ends and means within ISO are very much economic, trade-
oriented and in particular producer-oriented. This is to be expected, particularly when looking at the 
composition of national SSBs which are members of ISO but also the very essence of international 
technical standard-setting: it is the producers who feed the demand for international standards to 
alleviate costs. Indeed, traders are the main, if not only, demandeurs of international technical 
standards with a view to expanding market access, facilitating the smooth functioning of global supply 
chains, increasing interoperability and decreasing compliance costs. Other considerations such as 
safety or consumer protection considerations, for instance, would be accounted for within national 
SSBs or domestic public regulatory authorities.  
2. ISO Membership 
ISO currently comprises 160 members involved in the development of standards, which 
predominantly are national standardization bodies, which in turn are of a hybrid nature, but primarily 
composed of representatives from the private industry, whereas government staff experts act as 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Schepel, ‘The Empire’s Drains : Sources of Legal Recognition of Private Standardization Under the TBT Agreement’ in 
C. Joerges and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), above note 26, 397, at 404. 
69
 K. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘International “Standards” and International Governance’, 8(3) Journal of European Public 
Policy (2001) 345. 
70
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half a century before ISO, in 1906. When established, ISO largely mirrored IEC’s structure. Over the years, ISO and IEC 
became the twin organizations for international standard-setting, having a similar structure, common rules of procedure, 
joint technical committees and a common standardization grammar (the regularly revised ISO/IEC Directives, that is).  
71
 J. Yates and C. Murphy, ‘Coordinating International Standards: The Formation of the ISO’, 2006, available at: 
http://web.mit.edu/iandeseminar/Papers/Fall2006/Yates.pdf.  
72
 ISO Statutes, 17th edition (2013), Art. 2.1. 
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members in the national bodies.
73
 Again, this varies depending on the country’s (centralized or 
decentralized) approach to technical standards. In the US, for instance, where ANSI is a private entity, 
ISO standards are regarded as standards adopted by and addressed to private parties.
74
 In Japan, on the 
other hand, it is the Japanese Industrial Standards Committee, an advisory council of the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry, that represents the Japanese interests to ISO. While under the auspices 
of the government, JISC is in reality a multi-stakeholder body. Domestic structures do seem to 
influence the positioning of particular national interests within ISSBs. Allegations that the EU 
dominates international standard-setting through its regional SSBs and a ‘block-voting’ approach 
within ISSBs have been common.
75
 However, it was found that this observation most likely does not 
hold, or at least not to the extent argued by non-EU countries.
76
 
For each country, ISO accepts only one member, which is also the representative of ISO in that 
country. ISO has three categories of members: subscriber, correspondent and full members (or 
member body). Full members can be either participating (P-member) or observing members (O-
member). Full membership means unrestricted rights in terms of standards development. Only full 
members can unconditionally participate and vote. However, full membership is highly unbalanced: 
Some ISO members (ABENOR of Benin) only participate in one technical committee (TC), while 
other ISO members such as France, Germany or the United Kingdom participate in over 700 technical 
bodies, including TCs, sub-committees and working or ad hoc study groups.
77
 Again in these 700 
bodies, the degree of participation varies: In some, the ISO member will hold the secretariat, whereas 
in others it is an O-member. In 2013, there were over 700 active secretariats. Germany, the US and 
Japan appear to be sharing the lion’s share of the workload – but also, importantly, influence. Overall, 
Europe has traditionally been more active and this still is the case. By way of illustration, the 
European standard-setting bodies appear to hold about half of ISO’s active secretariats in 2013.78 
Such rights are not extended to subscriber and correspondent members. Correspondent membership 
amounts to an observer status to ISO. Correspondent members can also sell and adopt ISO standards 
nationally. This category of members varies considerably as well, including countries in the process of 
becoming EU members (Albania) and over ten African countries. The least active category is 
subscriber membership (currently encompassing 4 countries), whereby the national representative 
standard-setter cannot participate in standard-setting within ISO. In addition, such bodies cannot sell 
nor adopt ISO standards at the domestic level.  
In an attempt to allow for the less involved members to become acquainted with standards 
development processes, but also address concerns that were voiced with regard to lack of effective 
participation possibilities for developing countries, ISO decided to expand members’ rights for the last 
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two categories of membership for the year 2014-15. Only for that period, and without any additional 
charge, correspondent and subscriber members will be able to participate in up to five TCs; comment 
and vote on draft and final draft ISO standards prepared in these TCs in which they participate, as well 
as benefit from the ISO’s ‘twinning’ system through partnerships with P-Members. However, they 
will be unable to have any committee leadership role, which, in any case, necessitates considerable 
savvy. From the manner that this experimental scheme is structured one can infer that ISO would 
expect these members to be actively involved. For instance, if they decide to take advantage of the 
new rights, they must participate in the TCs as P-members. O-membership is not permitted under this 
new scheme. This would mean, for instance, that, at the end of the standards development process, 
those members are obliged to vote (and thus take an informed stance) on draft standards. 
In view of the high preparation costs for such a transition, the possibility of participating in the 
twinning scheme sounds more promising for the least emancipated ISO Members. The rationale 
behind the twinning system is that developing countries face many difficulties in playing a leadership 
role within ISO. Through partnerships with developed countries, a beneficial knowledge transfer may 
most likely take place.
79
 An example of a rather successful twinning is the ISO 26000 on social 
responsibility, whereby Brazil (chair) teamed up with Sweden (Vice-chair) to lead the Working Group 
that was created.  
II. Standard-setting process in ISO 
1. The understated political element of ISO standard-setting 
Standard-setting resembles law-making, for standards, like laws, are the outcome of discussion, 
bargaining, deliberation and compromise.
80
 However, standards established by ISSBs like ISO are not 
law per se, but rather serve a clear regulatory function prescribing rules for others to follow.
81
 The 
standard-setting process within ISO – and, indeed, all ISSBs – is a comprehensive regulatory function 
that not only sets the ends to be achieved through a particular international standard or ‘deliverable’ 
but also is eloquent as to the means (technical for the most part) that should be used.  
In other words, not everything about international standardization is technical; rather, international 
standardization has a political and technical dimension alike: The political process determines the 
ends to be pursued by materials, products, services and processes, whereas the technical dimension 
relates to the means that are most appropriate to achieve an end.
82
 While it would be reductive to 
suggest that all ISO members stand on equal footing as to the technical part of the standardization 
process, it would be equally reductive to purport that the characteristics of the political process within 
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ISO and the discussion (or lack thereof) of the ends pursued by a particular standard do not affect the 
authority of such standard and, ultimately, the authoritive collective action of ISO as a whole.
83
  
2. The various stages of standard-setting within ISO 
Standards are prepared within TCs. However, requests for the development of a given standard can 
originate in one or more national member bodies, a TC, a policy development committee such as 
DEVCO, the ISO Secretary-General or even an organization outside ISO (for instance, another 
international organization). Development of a given standard is typically regarded as a stand-alone 
project that should be terminated in a reasonable period of time.
84
 Standards can be developed in a 
new TC or in an existing one. TCs are established by the ISO’s technical management board (TMB).85 
The TMB has fifteen member bodies appointed or elected by the ISO Council and is chaired by one of 
the ISO Vice-presidents.
86
 The TMB is in charge of managing the TCs. Consensus is desirable 
pursuant to the TMB Working Procedures, but a minimum of two-thirds majority vote may be 
sufficient. In the case of a tie, it is the TMB chair who decides.
87
 The TMB has a decisive role to play 
in deciding on the approval or not of project proposals relating to the future development of new 
standards and the allocation of work to TCs. In exercising its functions, the TMB can conduct informal 
exploratory enquiries to review the dynamics of a new potential project. The TMB will establish new 
TCs only if a 2/3 majority of the national bodies voting are in favor and at least 5 national member 
bodies have pledged to participate actively in the work of the TC.
88
 Every TC will normally have a 
secretary and a Chairman. Secretariats are allocated by the TMB. 
Because of the rather decentralized form of ISO, the Secretariat of a TC will be run by an ISO 
member body (for instance the Association française de normalisation-AFNOR or the American 
National Standards Institute-ANSI), which will appoint a Secretary and nominate a Chairman. This 
solution was initially opted for to bridge the gap between those national SSBs which wanted ISO to 
have a coordinating role and those who saw ISO as a powerful international standard-setter.
89
 In 
theory at least, the TC Secretariat is bound to act in a purely international capacity rather than serving 
the national point of view.
90
 Depending on the breadth of the workload, sub-committees or working 
groups may be created. Working groups are quite important and becoming a convener in those groups 
may influence the structure, content and form of the final standard. According to the ISO/IEC 
Directives (hereinafter ‘the Directives’), the convener will normally be the project leader and will 
ensure that, in a given period of time, a draft standard will be available for the sub-committee’s and/or 
the parent TC’s consideration. 
There are over 240 active TCs within ISO.
91
 As the work of a given TC is very technical, having a 
bird’s view of developments in each and every TC is very difficult, if not highly unlikely. Typically, 
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national SSBs are called upon to act as secretaries in technical committees. Secretariats are distributed 
unevenly, with the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and DIN (Deutsches Institut für 
Normung, ANSI’s German counterpart) maintaining a disproportionally large number of such 
secretariats.
92
 By way of illustration, the German and American SSBs together account for almost 
forty per cent of the active TC secretariats and convenorships.
93
 
There are seven ‘project stages’ that show the development of the technical work within a TC 
(table 1).  
Table 1. The Stages of Standards Development within ISO 
 
Preliminary work items are introduced by simple majority of the P-members.
94
 This can then develop 
into a new work item proposal which will be approved provided that a simple majority of the P-
members in the TC agree and at least 4 P-members commit to actively contribute to the project (in 
TCs with over 17 P-Members, at least 5 P-members should make a commitment to this respect).  
In the preparatory stage, a work draft will be prepared. In this respect, the creation of a working 
group and the appointment of a convener may be necessary. Once a Committee draft is ready, national 
member bodies of the TC (both P- and O-Members) have the opportunity to submit comments and 
(Contd.)                                                                  
 http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards_development/list_of_iso_technical_committees.htm. 
92
 For the current figures, see ISO in figures 2013, available at : http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_in_figures_2013.xls . 
93
 Ibid. 
94
 See ISO/IEC Directives Part 1, 11th edition (2014), Art. 2.2.1. 
Project stage 
 
Associated document 
 
Name Abbreviation 
 
Preliminary stage Preliminary work item PWI 
 
Proposal stage New work item proposal
a
 NP 
 
Preparatory stage Working draft(s)
a
 WD 
 
Committee stage Committee draft(s)
a
 CD 
 
Enquiry stage Enquiry draft
b
 ISO/DIS  
IEC/CDV 
Approval stage final draft International Standard
c
 FDIS 
Publication stage International Standard ISO, IEC or ISO/IEC 
a
 These stages may be omitted. 
b
 Draft International Standard in ISO, committee draft for vote in IEC. 
c
 May be omitted. 
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consensus building on the technical content is sought. Comments should be compiled and the TC 
secretariat is responsible for indicating the action taken on each of the comments received. Successive 
drafts will be discussed in this respect until consensus among the P-members of the TC is achieved.
95
 
Once agreement is reached on technical issues, an enquiry draft is circulated.
96
  
At the enquiry stage, the draft standard is circulated to all national bodies for a 3-month vote. 
Importantly, this is the first time that ISO members which do not participate in the relevant TC will 
see the draft standard. Votes can be positive or negative – or ISO Members can inform of their 
abstention. Positive or negative votes can be accompanied by technical comments (or technical 
objections, respectively). A two-thirds majority of the P-member votes of the TC and the presence of 
not more than 25% of negative votes of all ISO members leads to the approval of the enquiry draft. In 
practice, approval of at least 75% of the national bodies casting a vote is striven for. Crucially, 
negative votes not accompanied by technical reasons do not count. This means that, in theory at least, 
a standard could pass this stage even in the – admittedly extreme, but still theoretically possible – case 
of abstention by all ISO members who are not participating in the relevant TC or in the presence of 
negative votes which raise non-technical concerns. This highlights the weight of P-Members’ behavior 
participating in the TC, but also undermines the importance of the political element in the technical 
standard-setting process.
97
 
If no negative votes were received,
98
 the TC can proceed to the publication of the final standard. In 
case the above-mentioned criteria are not met, the TC prepares a final text after incorporating the new 
comments and suggestions received. This final draft international standard (DIS) will be circulated to 
national member bodies for approval (approval stage). The same criteria for approval apply at this 
stage with the only difference that comments are no longer accepted in case of a positive vote. 
Negative votes must again state the technical reasons for rejecting the final draft, otherwise they do 
not count. If the criteria (2/3 majority of P-Members of the TC and no more than 25% of negative 
votes cast) are not met, the draft standard shall be referred back to the TC. In this case, the TC can 
even cancel the entire project or resubmit a modified draft which will undergo all previous stages.  
Alternatively, the TC may decide to publish the draft standard as a technical specification, 
particularly in case of persistent opposition or doubt as to consensus. In practice, this may happen only 
in case of receiving negative votes that state technical objections and exceed the 25% benchmark of 
the total votes cast. A technical specification shall not be in conflict with an existing international 
standard. Later on (typically every three years), it can be reviewed with a view to being adopted as an 
international standard, provided that the criteria are met.  
Finally, in terms of deadlines, three different tracks for the development of standards are possible: 
the accelerated standards development track (24 months); the default standards development track (36 
months); and the enlarged standards development track (48 months). The time runs from the date of 
adoption as an approved work item.
99
 In practice, standards development can last much longer, notably 
in case of controversy.  
A fast-track procedure is envisaged in the Directives,
100
 for instance, in cases of a standard 
developed in another ISSB that is recognized by the ISO or IEC Council. If the fast-track procedure is 
opted for, then the document can be submitted directly for vote as a draft international standard to the 
ISO members through the relevant TC or SC (enquiry stage). That document can be submitted directly 
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as a final draft international standard if the external ISSB is recognized by the ISO Council (approval 
stage).
101
 The fast-track procedure can in theory reduce the time needed for a standard to be adopted, 
but it can also lead to certain frictions in situations where a competing standard is discussed at the 
same time within the ISO ‘ordinary’ standard-setting process.102 
3. Collaborative international standard-setting 
ISO works in close collaboration with the IEC on all matters relating to electrotechnical 
standardization. Together with ITU, they have been the three sister organizations on technical 
standardization at the international level. While ISO and the IEC share the same set of directives, there 
are also directives which are specific to ISO or the IEC. In 1987, the first Joint Technical Committee 
(JTC 1) was created between ISO and IEC to prepare standards in the areas of ICT, including 
multimedia, ICT security or cloud computing.
103
 Along with ISO and IEC, a third important 
standardization body is the ITU. These three organizations are recognized as the only international 
standardization bodies in the field of technical standards for certain WTO Members such as the EU.
104
 
In 2001, ISO, IEC and ITU established the World Standards Cooperation (WSC) ‘to strengthen and 
advance the voluntary and consensus-based international standard-setting systems’105 that they created 
through the avoidance of duplication and overlap of work. The three ISSBs also cooperate in the area 
of patent policy by adhering to common guidelines.
106
 
III. Consensus building in ISO 
Generally, ISSBs choose consensus as the decision-making mode par excellence, which ISO defines 
as ‘general agreement, characterized by the absence of sustained opposition to substantial issues by 
any important part of the concerned interests and by a process that involves seeking to take into 
account the views of all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments.’ (Emphasis 
added) However, it is made clear that consensus need not imply unanimity.
107
 In addition, the 
Directives consider sustained oppositions as a peculiar category of objection. They are defined as 
‘views…maintained by an important part of the concerned interest and which are incompatible with 
the committee consensus.’108 The Directives call upon the leadership of the relevant body to solve the 
issue based on certain guidelines such as: the leadership of the committee must ensure that the 
opposition is sustained by an important part of the concerned interest, which will vary depending on 
the dynamics of the relevant committee; if so, it should be dealt with in good faith. The right of 
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opposing views to be heard is guaranteed in the Directives. However, and crucially, a sustained 
opposition is not akin to a right to veto. Thus, good-faith efforts are warranted, but progress of the 
committee work is not conditional on actual resolution of the issue. 
Although unanimity is not required, most international organizations aim at consensus building and 
have those mechanisms in place in their constitutions and secondary law.
109
 Consensus however can 
cause delays, whereby competitors argue for their preferred solution or simply hold out until one side 
concedes or withdraws to the benefit of the other.
110
 Endorsement of a given standard at the end of the 
process can generate substantial rents which make the effort worthwhile,
111
 but also confirms the value 
of (and, in the end, legitimizes) the standard-setter as a stabilizing factor in its capacity as a 
coordinating authority.  
In addition, it was shown that, in areas of rapid technological change and innovation and thus 
important rents being at stake (distributional conflicts), the standard-setting process may be slower in a 
consensus-based standard-setting body, but delays will be efficient when the underlying technology 
improves with the time. Thus, and quite importantly, at the end of the lengthy process it is likely that 
higher quality outcomes will be produced.
112
 This means that, contrary to conventional belief, and 
somehow counter-intuitively, striving for consensus may have a very limited impact to the technical 
and scientific excellence of a given standard. However, when vested interests are strong, relaxing the 
way consensus is required or identifying a neutral participant to break deadlock (i.e. binding 
arbitration or appeal mechanisms) may be preferable to increase the effectiveness of a given 
standard.
113
 
In practice, as explained earlier, ISO does not decide by unanimity or even consensus, but rather 
has adopted qualified majority voting rules in the various stages (from the preliminary stage to the 
enquiry draft and up to the publication stage) that lead to the adoption of an international standard.
114
 
According to the Directives, within ISO, if there is doubt as to whether consensus was reached for 
registration as an enquiry draft (that is, the TC draft), a two-thirds majority of the actively involved 
members in the TC (the so-called ‘P-members’, as opposed to the ‘O-members', which noted that they 
would like to have an observer status essentially within the TC) approving it would suffice.
115
  
The ‘two-thirds rule’ of the active members and the 75% of votes cast seem to be generally 
applicable. Thus, rather than unanimity, these the qualified majority voting modalities should be 
regarded as the general benchmark expressing the multilateral scientific consensus in the international 
technical standardization community. In line with this observation, a final draft international standard 
circulated by a TC is approved if two thirds of the votes cast by the P-members in the TC (rather than 
of the entire ISO membership) are in favor and not more than one quarter of the total number of votes 
of national member bodies cast are negative. The two conditions are cumulative. Abstentions do not 
count and the same goes for negative votes that are not based on technical reasons.
116
 This applies to 
                                                     
109
 See J. Steffek, ‘Sources of Legitimacy Beyond the State : A View from International Relations’, in C. Joerges et al, 
above note 49, 81, at 94. 
110
 Farrell and Saloner first described this tactic as a ‘war of attrition’, suggesting that it may lead to the technically best 
solution, but with a significant delay. See J. Farrell and G. Saloner, ‘Coordination through Committees and Markets’, 19 
RAND Journal of Economics (1988) 235. 
111
 M. Rysman and T. Simcoe, ‘Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard-Setting Organizations’, 54(11) 
Management Science (2008) 1920. 
112
 T. Simcoe, ‘Standard Setting Committees : Consensus Governance for Shared Technology Platforms’, 102(1) American 
Economic Review (2012) 305. 
113
 Farrell and Simcoe, above note 59. 
114
 See ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1 (2014), Art. 2.3ff.  
115
 Ibid., Art. 2.5.6. 
116
 Ibid., Art. 2.7.3.  
Procedural and Substantive Guarantees within ISO 
19 
both the enquiry stage and the approval stage. This means that objections with respect to procedural 
defects, for instance, would need to be raised at an early stage, i.e. at the moment that the relevant TC 
or subcommittee still discusses drafting. This is also made clear in the Directives of 2014, which 
provide that
117
  
…to avoid re-discussion, national bodies have the responsibility of ensuring that their technical 
standpoint is established taking account of all interests concerned at national level, and that this 
standpoint is made clear at an early stage of the work rather than, for example, at the final 
(approval) stage. Moreover, national bodies need to recognize that substantial comments tabled at 
meetings are counter-productive, since no opportunity is available for other delegations to carry 
out the necessary consultations at home, without which rapid achievement of consensus will be 
difficult. (Emphasis added) 
However, for this to be even possible in the first place, effective participation is a prerequisite. 
Effective participation would include the ability to be at all meetings, to follow several meetings 
simultaneously, which may be organized in different places around the world, and to find the way 
through a large number of technical documents in a short period of time. 
IV. Other procedural and substantive guarantees 
The Directives incorporate expressis verbis a right to appeal against decisions on new work items, 
committee drafts, enquiry drafts or final draft international standards within 3 months from the 
decision at issue. However, and quite crucially, this right to appeal is not unqualified; rather, it is 
reserved exclusively for P-Members. The TMB is in charge of considering such appeals. Appeals can 
be filed by P-Members only on condition that they are against the Statutes and Rules of Procedure, the 
Directives or detrimental to trade, safety, health or the environment. Appeals can relate not only to 
technical but also to administrative issues. However, they do not have suspensive effect, as the 
standards development can continue up to and including the approval stage.
118
  
In addition, appeals against new work items, committee drafts, enquiry drafts or final draft 
international standards are accepted only if they relate to technical matters or the reputation of ISO is 
at stake.
119
 When it comes to issues that must be answered in the negative or the affirmative, approval 
by the TMB requires that at least two thirds of the total votes be positive.
120
 Abstentions within the 
TMB are generally discouraged. If the TMB is in favor of moving forward with the appeal, a 
conciliation panel is established. The panel should resolve the dispute within a maximum of 6 months 
or refer the issue back to the TMB with its recommendations as to how the issue should be settled. The 
decision by the TMB can be appealed before the ISO Council Board. The decision by the latter on any 
appeal should be delivered within 3 months and is final. 
Furthermore, the Directives provide for a fairly detailed procedure that should precede the 
establishment of a new TC or the adoption of a new work item notably focusing on adducing evidence 
to substantiate the necessity thereof. The onus in this case lies with the proposer, particularly in 
establishing a substantial case about the ‘market relevance of the proposal.’121 Obviously, the level of 
detail in such proposals will vary, depending on the availability of technical knowledge and the 
existence of work previously conducted within ISO or elsewhere. Annex C of the Directives includes 
various procedural and substantive guarantees relating to the introduction of new work items 
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(specificity of the proposed item; relation to and impact on existing standards or work items; an 
indication of possible participating countries; an indication of stakeholders and so on) that aim to 
ensure the viability of the new work item and spell out the need for and the global relevance of a new 
standard in a particular area. The Directives give an indicative list of documents that can be submitted 
such as statements explaining the technological, economic, societal and environmental benefits of a 
proposed standard,
122
 but, the proposer is not bound by this list; rather, as indicated earlier, the 
proposer shall make first and foremost a substantial business case for the market relevance and need 
for a given proposed standard. 
In its continuous attempt to maintain its relevance, ISO has established two policy committees to 
inform its standardization work. The first, the ISO Committee on developing country matters 
(DEVCO) was created in 1961. DEVCO currently has 101 participating and 52 observing member 
bodies and meets annually. DEVCO also monitors the ISO Action Plan for developing countries.
123
 In 
accordance with ISO’s practice, P-Members have the upper hand in the discussions and actions, 
whereas many African countries but also other developing and least developed countries, having the 
status of correspondent members within ISO, can only participate as observers (O-members) and thus 
have no meaningful say. These countries cannot participate, nominate experts nor be in a chair’s group 
within the DEVCO.  
The same constraints apply to another ISO policy committee, the ISO Committee on Consumer 
Policy (COPOLCO). COPOLCO was created in 1978 and currently has 68 participating and 56 
observing member bodies. To date, COPOLCO has published 7 standards (mostly guides on how to 
take into account consumer issues when developing standards) under its direct responsibility 
(including updates of previous editions of guides). Direct links with consumers at the national level are 
rather weak or, for certain countries, non-existent. ISO, however, expects that consumer interests are 
taken into account at the level of the national standards body.
124
 When consumer-related issues are 
important elements of the development of an international standard, national standards bodies should 
consider including consumer representatives in their delegation.
125
 It seems that the involvement of 
consumers and consumer associations at the domestic level is a function of the sophistication of the 
national standards body.
126
  
Furthermore, the Directives provide for the regular review of international standards which should 
take place every 5 years at the latest. The review should not last more than 5 months and ends with a 
decision by the relevant committee to revise, confirm or withdraw the standard at issue. For 
confirmation, the threshold is rather low: use in at least 5 countries and positive vote by the simple 
majority of the P-members participating in the committee. If these members call for amendments to 
the standard, then the revision process is initiated. Use of the standard at issue in less than 5 countries 
should lead to the withdrawal of that standard. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that due to the importance of protecting intellectually property rights 
in standardization activities, ISO, ITU and the IEC agreed on a common patent policy in 2007 to 
address the problems associated with standard-essential patents (SEP).
127
 Substantive guarantees for 
intellectual property protection include in this case the right of the patent holder to deny access to her 
protected right (and thus the final draft standard should not include provisions depending on the patent 
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right) or to disclose her rights and then negotiate licensing and the level of royalties under fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND).
128
 The policy of ISSBs in principle would entail a 
hands-off approach: patent holders are entitled to defend their rights vis-à-vis potential users, but, due 
to the importance of the standard that is based on the patented input, the holders of that patent are 
required to negotiate agreements on the use of such patents on FRAND terms outside the ISSBs.  
In other words, bilateral agreements or settlement are encouraged but not administered by the 
ISSBs. Various issues of competition law nature can be of importance in this regard, including non-
disclosure of patented rights in order to extract higher royalties once the standard is adopted; 
prohibitive royalties which in effect limit market access; abuse of dominant position and so on. Again, 
these are issues that would be scrutinized by domestic competition authorities rather than the ISSBs 
themselves. 
V. An assessment of ISO’s standardization-related practices 
1. ISO at the crossroads 
ISO has been at the forefront of international rule-making in recent years. In view of the importance of 
technical standards for economic development and sustainable growth, limited participation and 
effective exclusion in ISO standard-setting activities have sparked debate. More recently, considerable 
efforts were made to increase effective participation but also expand the substantive subject-matter of 
the organization to include less technical areas such as those relating to the environment, labor or 
human rights.
129
 
All in all, the ISO standard-setting process seems to be quite streamlined, but various, significant 
issues remain. For instance, recall that 5 P-members suffice for the creation of a new TC. This would 
mean, at least in theory, that 3 P-members (simple majority) would be able to approve a new work 
item.
130
 Again, as noted above, a minimum of 4 P-members would be needed to commit that they will 
participate actively in the preparation of the new standard. Even so, in an organization of over 160 
member bodies, this is too low a threshold. In addition, note that a 2/3 majority (following our 
example, that is, 3 out of the 4 P-members!) would suffice to bring forward the draft standard as an 
enquiry draft. This would mean that, in theory, 3 P-members could lead the entire process up to the 
enquiry stage.  
In practice, crucially, all ISO members (that is, not only the relevant TC members) will see the 
draft standard for the first time at the enquiry stage. At that moment they merely have three months to 
raise technical objections and seek changes. First, and in view of the low threshold applied, it is 
questionable why comments should be limited to the technical aspects of the standard. Procedural 
deficiencies should be allowed to be raised by the membership at this level as well, all the more 
because these could not be raised earlier. With so many committees working simultaneously on a 
broad array of topics, one would reasonably assume that many members would become familiar with a 
particular standard proposed for the first time during this 3-month period of voting. Depending on the 
complexity of the technical content involved, while for some ISO members the time may be sufficient, 
for others (who lack a high level of sophistication in technical matters) three months would rather be a 
short period of time to be acquainted with complex technical matters. Acquisition of technical 
information in such a short period of time becomes so costly that members prefer not to seek acquiring 
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such the necessary information at all. If members know that their vote will not influence the final 
decision, they will not invest in information.
131
 
One could argue here, that even at that stage, ISO members could still express their disagreement 
and thus avoid the adoption of a manifestly technically shaky standard. In addition, P-members which 
participated in the TC work have a strong incentive to prepare a first-rate enquiry draft to compensate 
for the high start-up costs, but also because the more time they invest on preparing such a draft the 
higher their interest is for such a draft to be of high quality so that it is accepted more easily. In 
addition, information that flows too early or perhaps allowing voting at a very early stage may 
jeopardize the entire standard-setting process by making it overly political.
132
 Thus, from this point of 
view, allowing any objections to be raised for the first time at the enquiry stage does not constitute any 
serious prejudice on the non-participating ISO members in the TC. This may also be in line with the 
spirit of ISO voting: ISO does not introduce a general decision-making system, but a de facto 
supermajority system whereby votes presuppose information acquisition. It is contestation on the 
technical grounds that can improve a given standard – and such contestation can even occur at the 
enquiry stage. 
Both views presented here have their value and are sensible. However, even if the latter view is 
correct, no plausible reason seems to exist that would prevent TC members from sharing information 
with all ISO members about work on a new standard early on. For instance, while the committee draft 
stage seems to be quite important and various procedural guarantees are in place (for instance, prompt 
notification; notice and comment procedures; requirement to respond to all comments; revisions to be 
subsequently circulated), this stage is limited to the ISO members participating in the relevant 
committee. Whereas the committee draft stage appears to play a crucial role in line with the core 
principles of due process, the Directives suggest that, under certain circumstances, this important stage 
can be skipped if consensus (as defined within ISO) among the P-members is achieved.
133
 
A notification requirement towards all ISO members would constitute a procedural guarantee with 
immediate positive impact on the substantive rights of other ISO members. Such information, for 
instance, could be publicly available on the ISO website with a short, expedited notification/alert 
system. At extreme cases of opposition within a TC, early (perhaps indicative) voting could act as an 
alternative buffer that allows certain standards to move forward, provided that the broader ISO 
membership supports them despite opposition within the TC. Finally, objections should be allowed to 
be raised – and thus appeal procedures should allow for that – if any ISO member can prove serious 
prejudice to its rights.  
Significant path dependencies remain within ISO, as the previous analysis demonstrated, alluding 
sometimes to the need for a shift in ISO’s modus operandi: for one, the political dimension of ISO 
standard-setting appears not to be yet of immediate concern for the ISO leadership. This becomes 
obvious when we look at the imbalances between the rights of P-members, on one hand, and the other 
ISO members, on the other; the late notification of draft standards to all ISO members (enquiry drafts); 
the lack of any weight being given to negative votes which are not based on technical considerations; 
or, again, the limited possibilities for appeals which are not premised on technical grounds. Whereas 
the requirement for giving reasons is generally of a due process nature and aims at limiting arbitrary 
objections and delays, the non-participating ISO members in the relevant TC would more often than 
not ignore basic technical features of a particular standard that is presented to them as an inquiry draft. 
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Those participating actively (P-members), on the other hand, would have the necessary information. 
This asymmetry of information seems to be too late to remedy at the enquiry stage and appears to 
accentuate the gap between the more sophisticated – technically speaking – ISO members, and those 
which struggle to build capacity. The latter (admittedly, less informed members), when facing an 
enquiry draft would prefer to abstain
134
 or even cast a positive vote,
135
 which nevertheless is not 
necessarily based on a full grasp of what the standard stands for. Thus, the requirement for giving 
technical reasons appears to function as a presumption of fitness for purpose of the enquiry draft. This 
presumption is rebuttable, but obviously not many ISO members will have the capacities and 
knowledge to rebut effectively. 
This excessive focus on the technical aspects of standardization and late notification of proposed 
draft standards may lead to undue dominance of certain ISO members – most likely the sophisticated 
ones. This approach offers little in the effort to establish more inclusive forms of governance at the 
international level. This situation may perpetuate even at the post-adoption stage: at the moment of 
review of a given standard, the use of a given standard by just 5 countries would be sufficient for a 
standard to be regarded as an international standard of global relevance for ISO purposes. Other than 
the practice of exclusion that such a low threshold implies, it is also indicative of generally low 
thresholds that are set by the Directives with respect to key aspects of standard-setting, as mentioned 
earlier. 
Active participation is one of the ISO principles according to the ISO Code of Conduct for the 
technical work.
136
 This justifies the privileged status that P-members enjoy within ISO – a kind of 
reward for their willingness to invest in promoting standard-setting (e.g. through active participation in 
the early stages of new work items; the running of secretariats, convenorships or other leadership 
positions; or the posting of technical comments). This, however, neglects at the same time that 
standard-setting is inextricably linked with learning-by-doing: effective participation on a broader 
basis will never occur without capacity-building. This is the reason why the system of twinnings is a 
noteworthy initiative that may change – even if only at a slow pace – the ecology of international 
technical standard-setting, just as regional standard-setting initiatives in the developing world. The 
case of the EU is telling, in this respect. It is by now accepted that the empowerment of CEN and 
CENELEC through the New Approach within the EU also had beneficial effects for the weight of the 
EU’s bargaining power within ISSBs. 
Participation in standard-setting is not only a matter of states, but very much of non-state actors, 
including industry, consumer or labor associations, NGOs or other private interest groups. ISO claims 
to carry out its work in an ‘international, multi-stakeholder, multi-sector environment.’137 
Nevertheless, in principle, ISO would encourage its members to involve stakeholder interests at the 
national level, which then would have to be taken into account when preparing the national position of 
the representative SSB at ISO. With respect to consumer interests, COPOLCO has been active in 
addressing consumer-related aspects of standards by publishing guides instead of ordinary ISO 
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standards. COPOLCO works under the ISO general Secretariat’s responsibility, which appears 
difficult to square with the member-driven tradition of ISO.  
In the face of increasing criticism, ISO has attempted to open up its doors to consumers directly. 
For instance, Consumers International, a global federation of consumer organizations from over 110 
countries, has established a liaison with COPOLCO. The relationship, however, is rather 
asymmetrical, with P-Members still leading the discussions and ensuing decisions within COPOLCO. 
This approach becomes increasingly untenable: whereas, as noted earlier, producers used to be the 
only demandeurs of international standards, nowadays consumers also seek the adoption of 
international standards. Increasing labor mobility and cross-border safety concerns due to defective 
products can indeed lead to more pro-active advocacy on the side of consumers at the international 
level. Thus, not only producers, but also consumers have a substantial interest. The same goes for 
labor organizations in certain areas of ISO standard-setting such as management and production 
systems. Needless to say, questions of legitimacy, representation, participation and accountability can 
equally be raised with respect to consumer and labor organizations pointing to the need for 
benchmarking and potential reforms. In an era of increased legalization of rule-making at the 
international level, no actor active at this level is immune from such scrutiny.  
In addition, the expansion of the ISO agenda may lead to awkward results in view of the upgrade 
that the ISO output has experienced after the adoption of the TBT agreement. This became particularly 
apparent in the negotiations that led to the promulgation of the ISO 26000 guidance document. 
Although generally regarded as an international standard for ISO purposes, the document clarifies that 
it must not be considered as such for the purposes of the TBT agreement. Nor is it intended to provide 
a basis for any assumption or finding that a measure is consistent with WTO obligations, thereby 
discrediting the value of Article 2.4 TBT when assessing this particular ISO deliverable. As noted in 
the relevant literature, this exercise of self-restraint vis-à-vis the TBT agreement by ISO was the result 
of intense negotiations to limit the scope of the final product within the multi-stakeholder working 
group on social responsibility and constitutes a first.
138
 However, one wonders whether this is the price 
to pay for a more open approach on standard-setting and if so, what repercussions it may have on the 
relationship between ISO and WTO if such an approach spills over beyond guidance documents.  
Experimenting with new forms of standard-setting such as multi-stakeholder standardization may 
be a time-consuming endeavor, as it brings with in new ethos in the discussions, and thus takes 
traditional standard-setters – that focus predominantly on the technical aspects of the deliverables – 
out of their comfort zone. As the negotiations on the ISO 26000 showed, learning-by-doing has its 
consequences: it took about six years to finalize the guidance document, which is of a softer nature 
than a traditional ISO standard, as it cannot be used for third-party certification.  
Even so, the ISO 26000, with its ‘alternative production line’ model, is a worthwhile standard-
setting effort in view of the interests that were gathered to shape it: Experts from more than 90 
countries and 40 international or broadly-based regional organizations representing governments, 
NGOs, consumer associations, industry and so on came together to agree on a single guidance 
document.
139
 For ISO, this exercise is not only a matter of substance and scope, but also a matter of 
continuing relevance: with ever-increasing competition coming from ISEAL alliance, globalG.A.P. 
and other newcomers in the standard-setting market and with much focus shifting towards 
sustainability of production methods and global supply chains, ISO cannot simply disregard these 
voices. It must expand its agenda and, by implication, the interests represented at the standard-setting 
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table in view of its dominant position in this areas of transnational rule-making.
140
 Voices that are not 
allowed to be heard within ISO will most likely default if they see that chances of being heard are low. 
In such cases, they will look for other opportunities to fill what they perceive as a lacuna in 
international standard-setting matters.
141
 
3. Reviewing ISO practices against the principles of the TBT Committee Decision 
Respect of the TBT principles on the development of international standards may have the same result. 
Interestingly, the ISO Code of Conduct follows reverently the six TBT principles, which are upgraded 
to become by now ‘the key principles of international standardization’:142 consensus; transparency; 
openness; impartiality; effectiveness; relevance; coherence and the ‘development dimension’ (that is, 
as noted earlier, the requirement to address the concerns of developing countries) figure prominently 
in the ISO’s Code of Conduct. Thus, not only are the TBT principles endorsed by ISO; they have 
rather become guiding principles for its technical work.
143
 This means that no proper interpretation of 
these principles can take place without reference to the initial source document of these principles, 
which is the TBT Committee Decision.
144
 In other words, these principles do not have an ISO-specific 
meaning, but rather a WTO meaning, as elaborated in the TBT Committee Decision of 2000, 
subsequent meetings of the TBT Committee (e.g., the triennial reviews of the TBT Agreement) and as 
spelled out in the Panel and Appellate Body rulings such as the US – Tuna II ruling or future WTO 
disputes on TBT matters.
145
 The successful achievement of the trade-enabling objectives of the TBT 
agreement does pass through the development of international standards, which in turn raises the bar 
as to due process expectations within ISSBs.
146
 
With respect to the first two principles, the Decision is indicative of WTO Members’ intent to 
ensure that the development of international standards take place transparently and through wide 
participation. On transparency, the TBT Committee Decision requires that adequate time and 
opportunities are provided for written comments. In addition, the Decision appears to require 
dissemination of relevant information to all members of the standard-setting body early in the 
standard-setting process, much earlier than the current ISO procedures would provide. On 
transparency, there seems to be room for major improvements. In the first reaction by ISO to the TBT 
Committee Decision, ISO turned a deaf ear to the requirement of transparency as enunciated in the 
Decision. It recalled its decentralized nature to claim that it is for ISO member bodies to inform 
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domestic constituents,
147
 thereby neglecting the importance of direct communication and information 
channels that should be in place in view of the normative power that ISO has gained in the last two 
decades and the increasingly prominent role that it plays in international economic governance as a 
key trade-enabling institution.  
Admittedly, ISO’s move towards a more assertive role in international matters is slow. To date, 
ISO’s approach vis-à-vis transparency (but also participation) seems to be based on the publication of 
guides addressed to the national standard-setting bodies calling for more effective communication 
channels and dissemination of ISO’s work at the national level as well as for the adoption of an 
inclusive, multi-stakeholder philosophy when establishing the national stance on a given subject 
discussed within ISO.  
With respect to openness, the Decision requires the existence of meaningful opportunities for 
participation at all stages of standards development.
148
 According to ISO, it is for ISO members to 
assess their technical capacity and accordingly decide their membership status (O-, P-, subscriber or 
correspondent membership). While ISO is probably right to argue that ‘it is neither effective nor 
efficient to have all developing countries participate in all standard-setting activities at the 
international level’,149 there is a clear imbalance in the distribution of technical work and leadership 
tasks within ISO, which obviously mirrors decades of know-how acquisition on the side of developed 
countries. While it is indeed sensible to encourage developing countries to organize themselves at the 
regional level hoping for better representation at the ISO level, schemes and mechanisms that would 
offer direct access to ISO standardization activities are necessary. Again, the mechanism of twinning 
can only be considered as a necessary, but insufficient instrument towards more effective participation 
mechanisms. In addition, effective participation implies a significantly costly endeavor: absent 
financial means directed towards more regular participation by a broad ISO membership base, much 
of the work within TCs is dominated by industry-driven developed-country interests which have the 
necessary financial means to hold convenorships or TCs.
150
 Such transnational corporate domination
151
 
of the process of drafting standards may be worrisome in various respects, not only in terms of fairness 
and participation, but, more fundamentally, of legitimacy. 
The Decision further clarifies the importance of impartiality and consensus-building in ISSBs. 
Whereas it underlines the importance of meaningful opportunities to contribute to the elaboration of an 
international standard so that the entire process does not tilt towards the preferences of the few, it is 
more accommodating with respect to consensus, acknowledging indirectly that a decision-making 
system that takes into account the views of all parties concerned and seeks to reconcile conflicting 
arguments can meet the requirement enshrined in the Decision. Thus, the ISO’s double consensus (as 
noted earlier, two-thirds rule within the TC and 75% of the votes cast) seems to meet the requirement 
of consensus within the Decision. Recently, it was proposed that ISSBs follow the WTO consensus 
rule (a negative vote would amount to a veto right) or increase the threshold for adoption.
152
 ISO was 
not in favor of changing a decision-making system whereby objections were a rare phenomenon. 
Within the WTO, the idea of raising the threshold does not seem to gather sufficient support, all the 
more because the underlying rationale is everything but clear. Rather, WTO Members seem to agree 
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that in essence it is about arguments rather than votes, which would render redundant the setting of 
minimum benchmarks for consensus.
153
  
Effectiveness and relevance is the fourth principle set out in the Decision, which requires that 
ISSBs: (i) take into account relevant regulatory or market needs, and scientific and technological 
developments in the elaboration of standards; (ii) put in place procedures aimed at identifying and 
reviewing standards that have become obsolete, inappropriate or ineffective; and establish or maintain 
communication channels with the WTO. Regarding market relevance vis-à-vis a specific work item, 
the Directives include an important set of substantive guarantees to ensure the market relevance of 
new proposals for standards development. As mentioned earlier, the burden of proof lies with the P-
member that proposes new work. The ISO TMB has established a global relevance policy as early as 
in 2003, worried that its relevance for TBT purposes may be questioned. Interestingly, the Directives 
suggest that the adoption of the TBT ‘placed an obligation on ISO to ensure that the International 
Standards [sic] it develops, adopts and publishes are globally relevant.’ (Emphasis added)154 The TMB 
understands what is at stake: A standard failing to meet the requirements of the TBT Committee 
Decision may be challenged as creating a barrier to trade.  
Global relevance is defined within ISO as ‘the required characteristic of an International Standard 
that it can be used/implemented as broadly as possible by affected industries and other stakeholders in 
markets around the world’.155 As the intent is to capture and accommodate market dynamics through 
ISO standard-setting, regional or national differences would not normally be taken further unless they 
are essential (e.g., related to climate differences, anthropometry or embedded technological 
infrastructures) and thus are typically not subject to change and adaptation. Where such concerns are 
present, the ISO approach on introducing a unique international solution through standard-setting 
would not hold; rather, these concerns would need to be addressed. Again, within ISO, it is for the TC, 
and more specifically, the P-Members, to examine and confirm the global relevance of a given (new) 
work item and raise any essential differences that should be included in the standards. The latter 
should be presented to the other P-members of the relevant TC for approval as early as possible and at 
the latest at the Committee draft stage.
156
 Provided that essential differences form eventually part of 
the draft international standard, negative votes cannot be premised solely on the fact of such an 
inclusion. 
As noted earlier, there do not seem to be any compelling reasons limiting to P-members the right of 
raising essential differences. Furthermore, there is no review mechanism as regards the approval (or 
not) of such requests within a given TC (other than the general appeal mechanism within ISO, the use 
of which is, again, largely limited to P-members). The TMB does not seem to play any immediate role 
here as a more neutral control mechanism.
157
 Indeed, depending on the dynamics within a TC, 
undermining the importance of essential differences raised may be the prevailing stance: intuitively, 
most P-members would have no incentive to create loopholes within a given standard. Increased 
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compliance costs or delays in finalizing the Committee draft may be some of the reasons that would 
justify such an opposition by P-members within a TC. 
At the post-adoption stage, ISO includes a review mechanism of standards and technical 
specifications. However, a systematic impact assessment instrument does not form part of the ISO 
standard-setting system. Nor is such a requirement imposed by the TBT Committee Decision. 
However, the possibility of including such a requirement was proposed as a useful tool to ensure the 
continuous relevance and efficacy of a given standard.
158
 For instance, competing SSBs such as the 
ISEAL Alliance adopted an Impacts Code that requires the assessment of repercussions at various 
fields both during the drafting and after the adoption of ISEAL sustainability standards. 
The fifth principle of the Decision is coherence, which, pursuant to the Decision, points to the need 
for cooperation and coordination with other relevant ISSBs to avoid duplication or overlap. Thus, the 
concept of coherence does not refer here to the standards and standard-setting processes within a 
single ISSB, but rather the appropriate relationship among institutions with similar functions. ISO has 
such mechanisms in place, at least with respect to IEC at the international level,
159
 but also CEN at the 
regional level.
160
 The Vienna Agreement and the subsequently adopted guidelines are monitored by 
the Joint Co-ordination group of the TMB and the CEN Technical Board (CEN/BT) and entail two 
options for collaborative standard-setting: the ISO lead and the CEN lead. Thus, while recognizing the 
primacy of international standards, this cooperation agreement results in the CEN becoming a 
decentralized agent (and preferred strategic partner) for the development of new standards. The 
Guidelines provide that, if the expected results are not achieved, ISO or CEN can proceed separately 
in the development of standards. In addition, when the CEN lead is opted for (and for this a simple 
majority of the non-CEN P-Members of the ISO TC is required), CEN should ensure the due process 
rights of non-CEN ISO members (for instance, adequately respond to their comments). Under certain 
circumstances, and regardless of whether ISO or CEN were the lead organization, a decision may be 
reached to approve a given standard within ISO and CEN in parallel.  
Addressing the concerns of developing countries is the last principle that the Decision identifies, 
recognizing the challenges for effective participation in international standard-setting that these 
countries have diachronically faced. Notably, the Decision requires that ‘tangible’ ways of effective 
participation of developing countries must be sought. However, arguably in line with the soft, 
hortatory for the most part, language that is used in the WTO provisions relating to special and 
differential treatment for developing countries, the Decision defines this requirement in a negative 
manner in that it requires no de facto exclusion from the standardization processes within the relevant 
ISSB.  
As noted earlier, ISO has developed an action plan for developing countries for the period 2011-
2015, succeeding the triennial programs adopted in the previous decade.
161
 DEVCO monitors the 
proper execution of the action plan. The current action plan entails a more targeted approach with 6 
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output areas, including increased participation in the technical work. Even if the structure of DEVCO 
may not be the most adequate one for accommodating developing country concerns,
162
 the approach 
that the action plan takes appears eventually to be the correct one: actions for the strengthening of 
domestic standardization (including deliberation and multi-stakeholder input gathering) processes are 
coupled with actions within ISO, most prominently the twinning program. Twinnings can be more 
effective than many other technical assistance initiatives designed within the ISO Committee on 
developing country matters (DEVCO). 
However, there are some worrisome signs relating to this initiative: A recent survey showed that 
more than fifty per cent of these agreements are informal despite the existence of an ISO template.
163
 It 
also showed that the main beneficiaries of such agreements were the Chinese (23 agreements) and 
Brazilian (9 agreements) SSBs (as of September 2013).
164
 While not perfect, twinning is a very 
promising instrument that may force changes in perceptions and reforms in the domestic SSBs 
involved. It can lead to more serious efforts for mutual understanding, respect and eventually trust. It 
is quite telling that ISO national standards bodies from developing countries largely remain 
governmental agencies, whereas one would expect that private and multi-stakeholder participation 
leads to a hybrid form of representation, acknowledging the fact that, in most cases, technical 
knowledge and know-how is vested with private, industry-driven actors. Twinnings may instigate 
reflection and expeditious action towards the creation of more efficient structures with a view to 
becoming more eloquent, outspoken and confident at the ISO level. This will be beneficial for the ISO 
as well because more voices may raise fundamental issues of relevance for certain standards (for 
instance, due to important regional needs and peculiarities). 
Even if the approach vis-à-vis developing countries participation as expressed in the current Action 
Plan appears to go to the right direction at first blush, no systematic and rigorous review of the impact 
of such programs and plans (for instance, the ISO Action Plan 2005-2010) seems to have taken place 
to date.
165
 In addition, previous initiatives such as the Forum on Standards Actions in the Global 
Market (SGM Forum) had mixed results. 
The above analysis suggests that, although far from being flawless, the ISO efforts to address 
standards development-related developing country concerns are in the right direction, in view of the 
organization’s diachronic structural bias towards the most advanced global standard-setters, that is, the 
traditional players from developed countries. ISO has made good faith efforts to become more 
inclusive, but the need for reform is not limited at the ISO level; rather, effective participation is also a 
function of the level of – and determination for – reforms domestically. In other words, no change in 
effective participation levels will occur without empowerment of domestic standards development 
bodies and guarantees for respect of due process rights of stakeholders at the domestic level. It is no 
coincidence that ISO insists on the six principles being respected not only by TCs at the ISO level, but 
also by national standards bodies, notably those of openness, transparency and impartiality. 
Overall, ISO activities and processes appear to be guided to a large extent by the six principles 
enshrined in the TBT Committee Decision, but additional efforts are warranted to ensure full 
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compliance. A remaining interpretive issue is whether failure to comply with one of the TBT 
principles may be sufficient to question ISO’s compliance with the TBT Committee Decision and thus 
jeopardize the relevance of ISO’s standards for WTO purposes. In other words, is the adherence to all 
principles a precondition for a given ISSB to receive TBT clearance in accordance with Article 2.4 
TBT or a more holistic inquiring exercise of the ISSB’s overall activities and procedures would have 
to take place, balancing all existing evidence? In US – Tuna II, the Appellate Body did not seem to 
exclude the latter possibility, as it observed that ‘to the extent that a standardizing body complies with 
the principles and procedures that WTO Members have decided “should be observed” in the 
development of international standards, it would be easier to find that the body has “recognized 
activities in standardization”.’166 A proper reading of the Appellate Body’s approach suggests that no 
mechanical analysis of compliance of ISO (or, indeed, of any ISSB at issue) with the six principles of 
the TBT Committee Decision would be opted for.  
Rather, a broad assessment of the practices of the relevant ISSB would be made, along with an 
analysis of the procedures that led to the adoption of the standard at hand before a final decision can 
be reached as to the relevance of such a standard for TBT purposes. Taking ISO as an example, then, 
the WTO adjudicating bodies would examine whether ISO practices comply with the Decision in 
general, but also whether the Decision was respected when the specific ISO standard at issue was 
adopted. This would be the direct implication of the fact that, as submitted earlier, the characteristics 
of the process followed for the eventual adoption of a given ISO standard do affect the ultimate 
authority and value of that standard. 
D. Conclusion 
International standardization is key for economic growth and innovation. ISSBs constitute a forum for 
competition of ideas, whereby one of them (or a combination thereof) will become the reference point 
for production rocesses and methods globally. Technical merit and non-economic considerations battle 
for relevance, whereas the relevant institutions try to ensure their smooth functioning, as such clashes 
of conflicting values can easily lead to a stalemate. It is important to acknowledge that ISO has no 
easy mix of tasks to execute in this respect, pending between identification of technical superiority and 
guaranteeing openness and transparency. When it comes to procedural and substantive safeguards in 
global institutional settings, setting the bar too high may be misleading, as it does not capture the 
idiosyncrasies of hybrid, voluntary-based institutions active at the transnational level.
167
 Rather, 
ensuring a fair representation of a wide array of affected interests in the standard-setting process 
should be the objective of any transnational rule-maker. At the institutional level, responsive statutes 
and internal regulations should be in place, allowing for adjustments when needed and ex post control. 
Technocratic legitimacy may not be sufficient to discharge ISO of the obligations that it has as the 
global leader in standard-setting. As described earlier, ISO has undertaken serious good faith efforts to 
address complaints regarding its standard-setting processes notably with respect to participation, 
relevance and coherence. Its observer status at the TBT Committee also helped getting the pulse of 
those WTO Members, developing countries for the most part, which believe that access to ISO 
standard-setting is still intractable.  
The world of voluntary standards has evolved to affect more parties globally than initially thought. 
The early immunity that it enjoyed at the international level due to its non-public nature has eroded 
after the ‘multilateralization’ of the TBT Agreement. The voluntary character of standards remained, 
but the advent of the WTO changed the impact of international standards for ever. Regulatory 
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convergence and reduction of non-tariff barriers would now pass through the adoption of these 
standards, which were regarded as authoritive expressions of technical state of the art internationally. 
The TBT took an orthodox view vis-à-vis international standards: standards improve product 
efficiency and facilitate trade, notably when adopted at the international level, as compliance costs are 
reduced. Therefore, adherence to international standards becomes a necessary condition for the very 
attainment of the TBT objectives. 
Importantly, no grandfathering would be accepted: as established by the WTO Appellate Body in 
EC – Sardines, even standards adopted before the creation of the WTO would be considered to assess 
the consistency of the regulatory instruments of a given WTO member with the TBT. Non-compliance 
with these mandatory benchmarks for domestic technical regulations would raise suspicions as to the 
good intentions of governmental intervention. 
The emergence of new players in the international scene seeking to shape rule-making in 
international affairs more actively has played no less a significant role in increasing the impact of 
international standard-setting. Previously run in essence by the developed world, the international 
standardization community attracted the interest of an ever-increasing number of parties and thus had 
to become more inclusive without, however, putting into jeopardy its effectiveness with respect to 
consolidating technological advances. Admittedly, no empowerment of new ISO members is possible 
without effective participation. Thus, strengthening procedural rights is the gateway to more inclusive 
and representative international standards. In turn, only higher levels of participation can reduce the 
knowledge gap between developed and developing countries. 
This much-needed reform in ISSBs and the ISO was the result of developments within the TBT 
Committee, most notably the adoption of the TBT Committee Decision in 2000. Analysis of this 
Decision and its potential impact has been surprisingly scarce to date. It is the first time in the WTO 
that the delegation of regulatory power to ISSBs was made conditional to adherence to a series of 
principles, mainly of procedural due process nature. This Decision was vested with substantial legal 
value after the US- Tuna II ruling, showing the potential bite of WTO adjudication as an ex post 
legitimating device for international standardization: output by standards organizations will be 
critically reviewed and perhaps discarded if it fails to satisfy the principles set out in the Decision.  
Discussion on ISO standards has been a rare phenomenon in WTO adjudication.
168
 One reason for 
this may be because WTO Members consider ISO to function relatively well, in a transparent, open 
and efficient manner. However, closer scrutiny of ISO may prove otherwise. Using the example of 
ISO, this paper took an empirical stance to examine what type of procedural and substantive 
guarantees are in place to ensure that international standards adopted in international standardization 
fora are in line with basic tenets of due process or transparency. One of the basic findings of this paper 
is that much room for improvement of ISO processes exists. ISO has several steps to take to align with 
the telos of the TBT Committee Decision but also with contemporary demands relating to global 
governance institutions.  
The US – Tuna II ruling can potentially herald a new era of international co-operation in 
international standard-setting based on solid grounds relating to due process, consultation, reasoned 
regulatory-making, inclusion and technical excellence, particularly in light of the Appellate Body’s 
findings. At the same time, US – Tuna II was confined to a discussion of practices and institutional 
structures of a regional SSB, whereas it discussed shortly only one of the six principles identified in 
the TBT Committee Decision. Thus, nothing would prejudge the outcome of a dispute in which an 
ISO standard would be at issue. This paper, however, argued that the WTO adjudicating bodies will be 
no less willing to critically review the ISO standard-setting processes. This is also in line with a more 
critical view of international standard-setting, this time by WTO Members. Anecdotal evidence about 
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insufficiently inclusive and open procedures throw shades against ISSBs and the ISO was no 
exception. Current discussions in NAMA negotiations only exemplify this discontent. 
 Whereas this is a welcome development, if it leads to an era of more representative international 
standards, it is argued that a new conceptual framework is needed to inform the development of 
international standards in ISSBs. Such framework will inevitably build on the TBT Committee 
Decision, but shall include other criteria as well, notably with regard to sustainability
169
 and inter-
institutional sensitivity and cooperation with relevant international organizations but also NGOs, 
including consumers and trade unions, depending on the subject-matter (for instance, to ensure that a 
given standard also is line with pertinent labor or human rights). Indeed, from a normative point of 
view, for a standard to be regarded as a genuinely international standard, additional, but at the same time 
more concrete criteria would need to be developed. ISO seems to be very much focused on output 
legitimacy, which is a fairly appealing approach in an organization dealing with technical standards. 
However, input legitimacy (that is, allowing interested parties to be heard at an early stage in the 
process), early notification procedures and appropriate mechanisms for review that are easy to 
understand and use should be inextricably associated with the functioning of any organization that 
aspires to be a meta-regulator of technical matters at the international level. At the post-adoption stage, 
systematic impact assessment should be in place, allowing any ISO member to raise the need for 
revision. 
In addition, in line with the dual character of ISO’s mission (that is, technical and political), 
scientific rigor, relevance and technical excellence cannot be left outside any analysis as to the 
international character of a given standard. Furthermore, ISO still has to make decisive steps towards 
more openness vis-à-vis the public. Information on standard-setting processes and on disciplinary 
cases or appeals is very difficult to find. This undue secrecy may harm the public image of ISO. 
Interestingly, even non-technical information produced by ISO such as guides or recommendations of 
non-technical nature are only available with a fee. 
Finally, ISO also has an educational mission to accomplish which sometimes is neglected. The 
scratch line is not the same for all ISO members and this shows already in the distribution of technical 
work within ISO. Only by reducing the knowledge gap between ISO members one can hope for the 
creation of standards that largely reflect global preferences. This is a matter of political willingness 
and heavy investment: DEVCO regularly raises funding in ISO meetings, but urges the most 
sophisticated members to increase their efforts and ensuing investment. It is a matter of fairness, but 
also a strategic matter for ISO: What would happen if the newly emerging economies which start 
having significant monopsony power experiment with the creation of their own standards that diverge 
from ISO standards, based on arguments of effective exclusion within ISO? This could have 
undesirable consequences for all ISO members and everyday business and trade. Further research on 
the functioning of ISSBs would be necessary to shed light on best practices and policies as well as 
procedural deficiencies that perpetuate an unbalanced standard-setting landscape at the international 
level.  
 
 
  
                                                     
169
 ISO has recently published guidelines addressing sustainability in standards development. The guidelines are intended to 
encourage the examination of issues relating to sustainability during all stages of standards development within ISO. 
Importantly, the guidelines provide that the lack of considering sustainability issues in the development of a given 
standard can validly justify the revision of that standard and call for the involvement of knowledgeable experts in such a 
revision: See ISO Guide 82:2014. 
Procedural and Substantive Guarantees within ISO 
33 
Author contacts: 
 
Panagiotis Delimatsis  
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) 
Tilburg University 
Warandelaan 2 
Postbus 90153 
NL-5000 LE Tilburg 
The Netherlands 
 
Email: p.delimatsis@uvt.nl 
 
